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Introduction
On July 31st, 2017, Mr. Richard Smith, then CEO of Equifax,
woke up thinking it would be a normal Monday.1 He went to work
and held a seemingly routine meeting with the company’s Chief
Information Officer [“CIO”].2 Unfortunately, this was no routine
meeting: The CIO was informing Mr. Smith that an unknown
individual accessed the Equifax’s databases.3 However, the CIO
believed that the scale of the data breach was quite small, with no
personal information being exposed.4 So, they both concluded that
there was no reason to panic.5 Nevertheless, pursuant to the
company’s internal protocol, Equifax retained both a law firm and
a cybersecurity firm to begin investigating what had occurred and,
more importantly, how broad the damage was.6 For the next
several weeks, investigators worked around the clock, rebuilding
every command that was issued and finding out exactly what
happened.7 Finally, on August 15th, Mr. Smith’s worst fear was
realized: Personal information was indeed stolen from the Equifax
databases.8
The story the investigators pieced together is as follows. In
March 2017, the United States Department of Homeland Security
1. Richard F. Smith, Prepared Testimony of Richard F. Smith Before the
U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Digital
Commerce and Consumer Protection 3 (Oct. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115-IF17Wstate-SmithR-20171003.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
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found a major security vulnerability in a common business server
platform called Apache Struts.9 A letter was sent out to all major
businesses that use Apache Struts to make sure a fix was
implemented as soon as possible.10 Equifax got the letter, but, for
some unknown reason, did nothing in response.11 In May, two
months after Homeland Security’s letter, hackers used this
vulnerability to gain access to the Equifax systems, quickly
installing a backdoor.12 This meant that even if Equifax then
patched their systems to fix the Apache Struts issue, it was too
late, the hackers were in.13 The hackers then handed the reins over
to a more sophisticated hacking group and, for the next few
months, the new group rooted around Equifax’s systems.14 By the
time the hackers were discovered, they had stolen or otherwise
accessed roughly 143 million people’s personal information: A third
of the United States’ population.15 On September 7th, Equifax
announced to the world what had happened.16 In response, Mr.
Smith was compelled to testify before Congress and later resigned
as CEO of Equifax.17
This was not the first time valuable financial information has
been illegally accessed.18 Three years ago, Yahoo!’s databases were
hacked and every one of Yahoo!’s 3,000,000,000 email accounts
9. Id. at 2–3.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Michael Riley, Jordan Robertson, & Anita Sharp, The Equifax Hack
Has the Hallmarks of State-Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29,
2017 9:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/theequifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros (explaining the fact
that it was too late to fix the vulnerability in the Equifax system once hacked) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
14. See id. (“[A]s the attack escalated over the following months, that first
group—known as an entry crew—handed off to a more sophisticated team of
hackers.”).
15. Id.
16. See Smith, supra note 1, at 5 (“On September 7, 2017, Equifax publicly
announced the breach through a nationwide press release.”).
17. Id. at 1.
18. See Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack3-billion-users.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017) (explaining the story of the most
recent Yahoo! hack and the subsequent history) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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were accessed.19 The thieves made off with names, birth dates,
phone numbers, security question answers, and backup email
addresses used to reset lost passwords.20 While this information
seems unimportant, it becomes particularly damaging when
taking into account that it could be used to access other, more
important systems, such as government computers.21 Indeed, an
Eastern European hacking collective has reportedly sold this
information at least three times, and it is unknown what the
buyers will do with that data.22 Unfortunately for everyone, these
are only a few of the many examples of hackers compromising
systems to illicitly obtain information for financial benefit.23
Hackers have also attacked systems to reveal secrets that
have significantly less economic value.24 The largest example of
this was the Ashley Madison hack.25 Ashley Madison is a
well-known website that has one purpose: Facilitate affairs
between married individuals.26 Because of its unique goal, privacy
is incredibly important.27 Yet, in 2015, a group called “Impact
Team” hacked into Ashley Madison’s servers and accessed the
names, phone numbers, and credit card information of the site’s

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. (explaining the information obtained would be useful to a hacker
trying to access government computers).
22. See id. (“[L]ast August, a hacking collective based in Eastern Europe
quietly began offering Yahoo’s information for sale.”)
23. See, e.g., Nick Wells, How the Yahoo Hack Stacks Up to Previous Data
Breaches, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/04/howthe-yahoo-hack-stacks-up-to-previous-data-breaches.html
(listing
other
examples of unauthorized data access and subsequent disclosure by third parties)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
24. See Tom Lamont, Life After the Ashley Madison Affair, GUARDIAN (Feb.
27, 2016 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/28/whathappened-after-ashley-madison-was-hacked (explaining the story of how Ashley
Madison was hacked and the subsequent history) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
25. See id. (“[H]ackers leaked the names of 30 million people who had used
the infidelity website Ashley Madison.”).
26. See id. (explaining the intention of Ashley Madison to help married
people have affairs with each other).
27. See id. (“Ashley Madison claimed to have an international membership
of 37.6 million, all of them assured that their use of this service would be
anonymous, 100% discreet.”).
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roughly 37 million users.28 They even had some information on
users’ height, weight, and erotic preferences.29 Impact Team then
threatened to publicly release this information unless Ashley
Madison shut down.30 Ashley Madison refused, so, on August 18th,
Impact Team released the information.31 The released names
included senior executives, priests, celebrities, military members,
and the list goes on.32 Those revealed were publicly shamed and
ridiculed.33 In Alabama, for example, a newspaper printed all the
names of those who were using the website and lived in the area.34
Marriages were destroyed, business executives resigned, and some
people even committed suicide.35
These high-profile hacks are not uncommon.36 In fact,
according to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, there have been at
least 7,961 data breaches, exposing over 10,000,000,000 accounts
in total, since 2005.37 These shocking numbers are not particularly
surprising when taking into account the value of information
stolen.38 For example, cell phone numbers, as exposed in the

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (“[P]oliticians, priests, military members, civil servants,
celebrities–these and hundreds of other public figures were found among the
listed membership.”).
33. See id. (“Moral crusaders, operating with impunity, began to shame and
squeeze the exposed.”).
34. See id. (“In Alabama editors at a newspaper decided to print in its pages
all the names of people from the region who appeared on Ashley Madison’s
database.”).
35. See id. (describing the unfortunate aftermath of the information leak).
36. See Wells, supra note 23 (listing other examples of unauthorized data
accesses and subsequent disclosure by third parties).
37. See
Data
Breaches,
PRIVACY
RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (listing
the number of publicly disclosed data breaches and how many accounts have been
exposed from them) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
38. See CESAR CERRUDO & ESTEBAN MARTINEZ FAYO, HACKING DATABASES FOR
OWNING YOUR DATA 3 (2007), https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe07/Cerrudo/Whitepaper/bh-eu-07-cerrudo-WP-up.pdf (listing the value of various
personal information on the black market) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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Yahoo! hack above, are worth $10 a piece on the black market.39
The Yahoo! hack exposed 3,000,000,000 phone numbers.40 Taking
that number and multiplying it by the value of a cell phone
number, $10, the hackers stood to make $30,000,000,000 from that
one hack. That dollar amount does not even consider copies the
hackers could make and later resell. Yet while these hackers make
astronomical payoffs, the release of this information damages
people’s lives in multiple ways.41 Some suffer immense emotional
turmoil, others are left in financial ruin.42 Nevertheless, there is a
deep circuit split as to whether the fact that information was stolen
is intrinsically sufficient to grant standing to those whose
information was stolen to sue the hacked entity.43 In particular,
39. See id. (listing the value of cell phone numbers on the black market).
40. See Nicole Perlroth, supra note 18 (listing the number of Yahoo! accounts
compromised).
41. See Lamont, supra note 24 (explaining the damage caused by the Ashley
Madison hack); see also Riley, Robertson, & Sharp, supra note 13 (explaining the
damage caused by the Equifax hack).
42. See Lamont, supra note 24 (explaining the damage caused by the Ashley
Madison hack); see also Riley, Robertson, & Sharp, supra note 13 (explaining the
damage caused by the Equifax hack).
43. Compare Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276–77 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017) (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties
while in the care of the defending party), and In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763,
771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was stolen from defendant); and Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d. Cir. 2011) (same), with Galaria v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Comp., 663 F. App’x 384, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that
there is sufficient injury to grant standing when a plaintiff’s information is
illegally stolen from the defending party), and Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group,
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding the injury requirement satisfied
when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen from the defending party because
there is a “substantial risk” that future harm will occur (quoting Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted))), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“If a plaintiff faces ‘a credible threat of harm’ and that harm is ‘both real and
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ the plaintiff has met the
injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III . . . . On these
facts . . . Plaintiffs . . . have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of
Article III standing.” (first quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States,
306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002); and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1938))), and Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (finding sufficient injury to grant standing for plaintiffs whose
information was hacked from defendant, particularly noting the costs plaintiffs
incurred to mitigate future damages).
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the question becomes, “is the increased risk of future injury enough
to grant standing?”44 In Part I of this note, I will briefly discuss the
history of constitutional standing and the current test. In Part II,
I will explain the aforementioned circuit split. In Part III of this
note, I will argue why the courts should answer the question above
in the affirmative: The increased risk of future injury is sufficient
to grant standing. In Part IV, I will argue alternative ways that
courts could and should find sufficient injury to grant standing if
the significantly increased risk of future injury is not enough. I
note at the outset that this note only deals with the question of
standing, not necessarily the merits of any case or any other
possible defenses, such as sovereign immunity or the economic loss
rule.
I. Traditional Standing Requirements
A. History of Standing
The United States Constitution limits courts to only hear
“cases” and “controversies.”45 Whether a lawsuit is a case or
controversy, as defined above, is the question of standing.46 That
question is a threshold one.47 It must be resolved before deciding
the merits on a case, even if neither party challenges it.48 Modern
constitutional standing first began in the case of Fairchild v.
Hughes,49 where the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff must
have a direct injury to sue.50 It was later reinforced in
44. See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 276–77 (finding that the threat of injury was
too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by
third parties while in the care of the defending party (emphasis added)).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases [and] . . . controversies.”).
46. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[S]etting apart
the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article
III . . . is the doctrine of standing.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1)).
47. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (addressing preliminary
questions of standing before addressing the merits of the case, even though
neither party challenged standing).
48. See id. (same).
49. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–130 (1922) (ruling that a
private citizen cannot challenge the validity of a statute or a constitutional
amendment without direct injury).
50. See id. at 129 (finding that a private citizen cannot sue to stop a statute
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Massachusetts v. Mellon.51 From there, standing evolved,
eventually becoming the modern three part test of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.52
B. Current Standing Requirement
The current constitutional minimum for standing has three
elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant . . . . Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.53

The plaintiff must prove each element.54 Although, “general
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
may suffice.”55 If there is no standing, the judicial system cannot
hear the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.56
In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,57 the U.S. Supreme Court
further explained the “injury in fact” requirement for standing.58
from passing without a direct injury).
51. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (finding that the
constitution’s separation of powers requires the judicial system to only hear cases
where an individual has been directly injured).
52. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (ruling that
plaintiffs must be injured, that injury must have been caused by the defendant,
and a favorable ruling can redress the injury).
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).
54. See id. at 561 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden
of establishing these elements.”).
55. Id.
56. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(concluding that without Article III standing, the judicial system loses
subject-matter jurisdiction (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61)).
57. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (holding that
the respondents lacked Article III standing because future injury was not
imminent).
58. See id. at 409 (explaining further how to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement).
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Specifically, the Court said “‘threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of
possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”59 Courts subsequently
interpreted this to mean that the injury requirement is fulfilled if
it is found that there is a substantial risk for future harm to occur,
even if it is not a complete certainty.60
The Supreme Court further elucidated this requirement in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.61 As stated before, the injury (or threat of
future injury) must be both particularized and concrete.62 For an
injury to be particularized “[the injury] must affect the plaintiff in
a personal and individual way.”63 While particularized is
important, it is different from concrete.64 A concrete injury is an
injury that is “real, and not abstract.”65 However, “concrete” is not
necessarily synonymous with “tangible.”66 While tangible is easy
to recognize as a “concrete” injury, there are intangible, concrete
injuries.67 In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes
an injury sufficient for Article III standing, the Court gave three
guides.68 First, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts.”69 Second, “because Congress is well
59. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
60. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., 663 F. App’x 384, 388
(6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has also ‘found standing based on a
substantial risk that the harm will occur’ . . . even where it is not ‘literally certain
the harms . . . will come about.’”) (internal citations omitted).
61. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (explaining the
nuances of the injury requirement of constitutional standing).
62. See id. (“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”) (internal
citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. See id. (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it
is not sufficient.”).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1549.
67. See id. (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we
have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can
nevertheless be concrete.”).
68. See id. (presenting the three requirements for an intangible harm to
constitute an injury in order to satisfy Article III standing).
69. Id.
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positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article
III standing requirements, its judgment is also instructive and
important.”70 Lastly, common law can also create intangible harms
that satisfy the injury requirement of Article III standing.71
With this precedent in mind, the Supreme Court created two
tests to determine if future injury satisfies the injury-in-fact
standing requirement: The “certainly impending” and “substantial
risk” tests.72 The “certainly impending” test requires that the
injury does not rely upon a “highly attenuated chain of
possibilities” and is imminent.73 The “substantial risk” test
requires a finding that there is a “substantial risk that the harm
will occur.”74 If either test is satisfied, there is sufficient injury to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing.75
II. Case Law Examining This Issue
As mentioned above, there is a circuit split on this issue of
standing in data breach cases.76 The Fourth, Eighth, and Third
Circuits have each ruled that plaintiffs have no standing to sue an
entity when the plaintiff’s information was illegally stolen from
that entity.77 Those courts concluded that there had not yet been
70. Id.
71. See id. (“[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims
even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”).
72. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)
(ruling that a plaintiff can establish sufficient injury to grant standing by
satisfying either the “certainly impending” or “substantial risk” test).
73. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013)
(explaining the “certainly impending” test).
74. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (explaining the “substantial risk” test).
75. See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (ruling that a plaintiff can establish
sufficient injury to grant standing by satisfying either the “certainly impending”
or “substantial risk” test).
76. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (illustrating the
circuit split on the issue of standing in data breach cases).
77. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding
that the threat of injury was too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs whose
data was stolen from defendant); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46
(3d Cir. 2011) (same); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2017)
(finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs
whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties while in the care of the defending
party).
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an injury under law. However, when the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits examined this legal issue, each found sufficient injury to
confer standing.78 As will be explained below, the significantly
increased chances of future injury should be enough to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement.
A. Cases That Failed to Find Standing
1. Beck v. McDonald79
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed this question in Beck v.
McDonald.80 On February 11, 2013, a laptop was stolen from Dorn
VAMC’s Respiratory Therapy Department.81 The laptop contained
unencrypted personal information of approximately 7,400
patients.82 This personal information included names, birth dates,
the last four digits of social security numbers, and certain physical
descriptors.83 Further investigation revealed that Dorn VAMC
failed to follow standard policies and procedures to ensure safe

78. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Comp., 663 F. App’x 384,
390–91 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that there is sufficient injury to grant standing
when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen from the defending party); see also
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding
the injury requirement satisfied when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen
from the defending party because there is a “substantial risk” that future harm
will occur (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted))); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139,
1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If a plaintiff faces ‘a credible threat of harm’ and that harm
is ‘both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ the plaintiff has met
the injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III . . . . On these
facts . . . Plaintiffs . . . have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of
Article III standing.” (first quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States,
306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002); and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1938))); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (finding sufficient injury to grant standing for plaintiffs whose information
was hacked from defendant, particularly noting the costs plaintiffs incurred to
mitigate future damages).
79. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
80. See generally id. (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties
while in the care of the defending party).
81. Id. at 267.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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storage of patient information.84 In response, Richard Beck and
Lakeshia Jeffery, two individuals whose information was exposed,
filed a class action lawsuit.85
In July 2014, a similar fact pattern occurred: Four boxes were
discovered missing, again from Dorn VAMC.86 Those reports
contained identifying information of over 2,000 patients, including
names, social security numbers, and medical diagnoses.87 In
response, Beverly Watson, an individual whose information was
now exposed, brought a separate class action lawsuit.88
In both cases, the claims were dismissed for want of standing,
relying upon Clapper’s explanation on how future injury can
convey standing.89 Both Beck and Watson appealed to the Fourth
Circuit and their appeals were consolidated to the present case.90
Their argument was that the increased risk of future identity theft
is sufficient injury or, in the alternative, the cost of protecting
against the same is also sufficient injury.91
The Fourth Circuit began by examining the requirements of
standing, focusing on the injury-in-fact requirement.92 The court
noted at the offset that “threatened rather than actual injury can
satisfy Article III standing requirements.”93 However, “not all
threatened injuries constitute an injury-in-fact.”94 Ultimately, the
Fourth Circuit focused its analysis on whether either alleged
“injury”—the data breach itself or the cost to protect against future
identity theft—was a “distinct and palpable [injury], as opposed to
[a] merely abstract [one.]”95
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 268.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 268–69 (ruling the Beck plaintiffs lacked standing under the
Privacy Act).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 273 (discussing Petitioner’s argument that increased risk of
future identity theft and the cost of protecting against it constitutes injury).
92. See id. at 270 (“We focus our inquiry on the first element of Article III
standing: injury-in-fact.”).
93. Id. at 271 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling,
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
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Turning first to the increased risk of future identity theft, the
Fourth Circuit noted the deepening circuit split on this issue.96 The
court then differentiated the current case from the cases where
standing was found by ruling that in the other cases, the hacker
“intentionally targeted the personal information compromised in
the data breaches” as opposed to this fact pattern.97 Specifically,
the Fourth Circuit looked at four cases where standing was found:
Galaria v. Nationwide Ins. Comp.,98 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Group, LLC,99 Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp,100 and Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp.101 The court pointed out that in Galaria, “hackers
broke into Nationwide’s computer network and stole the personal
information of Plaintiffs and 1.1 million others,” which did not
happen here.102 In Remijas, the Fourth Circuit noted that the only
logical conclusion for hackers to break into a store’s database and
steal consumer private information is to target personal
information; again, the Fourth Circuit said this is not present
here.103 In Pisciotta, the court said that the “scope and manner of
intrusion into [the] banking website’s hosting facility was
sophisticated, intentional, and malicious,” which, according to the
Fourth Circuit, did not happen here.104 Lastly, in “Krottner, at least
96. Id. at 273 (“Our sister circuits are divided on whether a plaintiff may
establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of future identity
theft.”).
97. Id. at 274.
98. See Galaria v. Nationwide Ins. Comp., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 391 (6th Cir.
2016) (ruling that plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring their action
involving a data hack).
99. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir.
2015) (ruling that customers have Article III standing to bring their action by
showing a substantial risk of harm from the store's date breach).
100. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or
by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm
that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant's actions.”).
101. See id. (comparing the present case with other cases that addressed the
same legal question).
102. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Galaria v.
Nationwide Insurance Comp., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016)).
103. See id. (“In . . . Remijas, . . . the data thief intentionally targeted the
personal information compromised in the data breaches. . . . Here, the Plaintiffs
make no such claims.”) (citing Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d
688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015)).
104. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp,
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one named plaintiff alleged misuse or access of that personal
information [stolen] by the thief,” implying the hacker targeted the
information used.105 As of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, there had
not been a case of identity theft yet in Beck.106
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the data thief in
Beck did not target the laptop, or boxes, for its personal
information and, therefore, the increased chance of future identity
theft is not a sufficient enough injury-in-fact to confer standing.107
Notwithstanding the fact that the laptop was deemed to have been
stolen, the court focused on the concept that an “attenuated chain
of possibilities” would have to occur for Plaintiffs to be subject to
identity theft.108 Such “attenuated chain of possibilities” is not
sufficient to confer standing.109
Having walked through the “certainly impending” test, the
Fourth Circuit continued by analyzing the “substantial risk”
standard set forth by Clapper.110 The Plaintiffs alleged that 33% of
those affected will become victims of identity theft.111 The court,
however, quickly devalued that argument by interpreting Clapper
as setting an incredibly high bar to reach in order to obtain
standing requirement.112 Consequently, Plaintiffs were found to
499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007)).
105. See id. (“[N]amed plaintiff alleged that, two months after theft of laptop
containing his social security number, someone attempted to open a new account
using his social security number.” (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010)).
106. See id. (concluding that no plaintiff has alleged that her data has been
stolen).
107. See id. (“Here, the Plaintiffs make no such claims [of the data thief
intentionally targeting the personal information or of misuse of stolen data by the
thief]. This in turn renders their contention of an enhanced risk of future identity
theft too speculative.”).
108. See id. at 275 (“[F]or the Plaintiffs to suffer the harm of identity
theft . . . we must engage with the same ‘attenuated chain of possibilities’ rejected
by the [U.S. Supreme] Court in Clapper.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147–48 (2013))).
109. See id. (same).
110. See id. (“Nonetheless, our inquiry on standing is not at an end, for we
may also find standing based on ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which
in turn may prompt a party to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that
harm.” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5)).
111. Id. at 275–76.
112. See id. at 276 (“[W]e read Clapper[] . . . to express the common-sense
notion that a threatened event can be ‘reasonably likely’ to occur but still be

BYTES BITE

257

not have satisfied the injury requirement of standing with the
increased risk of future identity theft.113
The Fourth Circuit briefly looked at Plaintiff’s second
argument: The cost of mitigative measures is sufficient injury to
confer standing.114 However, that argument was summarily
rejected as the court said, “[these] self-imposed harms cannot
confer standing.”115 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that
Plaintiffs did not have standing here to sue.116
2. In re SuperValu, Inc.117
A similar legal issue was posed to the Eight Circuit in In re
SuperValu, Inc.118 SuperValu, Inc. [hereinafter “SuperValu”] was
the victim of two cyberattacks in 2014.119 The first occurred from
June 22, 2014 to July 17, 2014.120 During that time, hackers
installed malicious software on SuperValu’s computers that
allowed them to gain access to and then steal the payment
information of SuperValu’s customers.121 This included the
customer’s names, credit or debit card account numbers, expiration
dates, card verification value codes, and personal identification
numbers.122 On August 14, 2014, SuperValu issued a press release

insufficiently ‘imminent’ to constitute an injury-in-fact.”(citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct.
at 1147–48)).
113. See id. (finding that none of the arguments set forth by Plaintiffs
regarding the increased risk of future harm is sufficient injury to grant standing).
114. See id. at 276–77 (“Next, we turn to the Plaintiffs’ allegation that they
have suffered an injury-fin-fact because they have incurred or will in the future
incur the cost of measures to guard against identity theft, including the costs of
credit monitoring services.”).
115. Id.
116. See id. (affirming the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs did not
have standing to pursue their claims).
117. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
118. See id. at 770–72 (discussing whether the increased risk of future
identity theft stemming from a data breach is sufficient to grant standing to those
whose information was stolen).
119. Id. at 766.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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notifying customers of the intrusion.123 SuperValu also noted that
they were conducting an on-going investigation into the
incident.124
On September 29, 2014, SuperValu announced that a second
data breach took place in late August or early September 2014.125
According to the release, the second data breach126 involved an
intruder installing malicious software onto the same system that
was compromised in the first data breach.127 This second type of
malicious software achieved the same end goals as the first: Allow
the hackers to have access to customers’ personal card
information.128
After the two press releases, Plaintiffs filed suit claiming
SuperValu failed to take adequate measures to protect customers’
card information.129 Because of that failure, Plaintiffs argued that
they were subjected to an imminent and real possibility of identity
theft.130 Specifically, the thieves would siphon money from the
customers’ various accounts, open new accounts, or sell the
information to others who intend to commit fraud.131 In fact, one of
the Plaintiffs alleged that there were already fraudulent charges
on his credit card statement stemming from the initial data
breaches.132 The district court dismissed the complaint, “finding

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. SuperValu claimed the two breaches were separate, but the Plaintiffs
disputed that contention in their complaint. Id. It is irrelevant to this note which
sequence of events is correct.
127. See id. (“The press release stated that an intruder installed different
malicious software onto the same network.”).
128. See id. (“Defendants acknowledged that the software may have captured
Card Information from debit and credit cards used to purchase goods at their
stores, but at the time of the press release, there had been no determination that
such information was ‘in fact stolen.’”).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 766–67.
132. See id. at 767 (“Shortly after the data breach was announced, ‘Holmes
noticed a fraudulent charge on his credit card statement and immediately
cancelled his credit card, which took two weeks to replace.’”).
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that none of the plaintiffs had alleged an injury-in-fact and thus
did not have standing.”133 Plaintiffs appealed.134
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the
abecedarian principles of Article III standing: Injury, causation,
and redressability.135 In particular, the Eighth Circuit, like the
Fourth Circuit, analyzed the injury requirement.136 Put another
way, the court analyzed “whether Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly
demonstrate that the risk that plaintiffs will suffer future identity
theft is substantial.”137 At the outset, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that their card information
was stolen by the hackers.138 The court then noted that the plaintiff
who alleged fraudulent credit card transactions, Holmes, had
sufficient injury.139 However, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
other plaintiffs failed to allege an injury-in-fact with the increased
risk of future harm.140 This conclusion hinged upon a government
report analyzing data breaches and their aftermaths.141
The Eight Circuit first noted, using the government report
mentioned above, that the information stolen would not allow for
someone to open new bank accounts without the proper owner’s
knowledge.142 The court continued by concluding that the findings
of the GAO report indicate that the odds of someone’s identity
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 767–78 (discussing the elements of constitutional standing).
136. See id. at 768 (“This case primarily concerns the injury in
fact . . . element.”).
137. Id. at 770.
138. See id. at 770 ([W]e are satisfied that the complaint sufficiently alleges
that the hackers stole plaintiffs’ Card Information.”).
139. See id. at 772 (“[P]laintiff Holmes alleges a present injury in fact to
support his standing.”).
140. See id. at 771–72 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint has not
sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of identity theft, and Plaintiffs’ allegations
of future injury do not support standing in this case.”).
141. See id. at 770–71 (dissecting a 2007 Government Accountability Office
report on data breaches and determining that it fails to support plaintiffs’
contention of sufficient increased risk of future injury) (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE
FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN (2007) [hereinafter “GAO report”]).
142. See id. at 770 (“As the GAO report points out, compromised credit or
debit card information, like the Card Information here, generally cannot be used
alone to open unauthorized new accounts.” (internal citations omitted)).
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being taken is too small to satisfy the constitution’s requirements
for injury-in-fact.143 However, the court also noted that the GAO
report found that “comprehensive information on the outcomes of
data breaches is not available . . . and the extent to which data
breaches result in identity theft is not well known.”144
Notwithstanding these informational defects within the GAO
report, the court concluded that the GAO report proves that the
increased risk of future injury was too speculative to grant
standing.145
3. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.146
The Third Circuit also analyzed this legal issue in Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp.147 In that case, Ceridian Corp. suffered a security
breach when an unknown hacker infiltrated the company’s payroll
system.148 This breach exposed personal and financial information
of approximately 27,000 employees at 1,900 companies.149
However, the Court noted that hackers may not have read, copied,
or understood the data.150 When Ceridian learned of the data
breach, they informed the victims, and this suit followed.151
Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging that they were injured
by, “an increased risk of identity theft, . . . incurred costs to
monitor their credit activity, and . . . emotional distress.”152 Like
the two previous cases mentioned above, the district court
143. See id. at 771 (discussing the report’s findings on how many data
breaches are known to have caused identity theft, ultimately concluding that the
report “does not support the allegation that [SuperValu’s] data breaches create a
substantial risk that plaintiffs will suffer credit or debit card fraud”).
144. Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing GAO report at 21).
145. See id. at 771–72 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint has not
sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of identity theft, and plaintiffs’ allegations
of future injury do not support standing in this case.”).
146. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
147. See generally id. (affirming the District Court’s determination that the
plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to plead actual injury and therefore lacked
standing).
148. Id. at 40.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for want of standing.153 Plaintiffs
appealed.154
In its inquiry, the Third Circuit also focused on the injury
requirement of standing.155 Particularly, the Third Circuit
highlighted the limiting nature of the injury requirement, stating,
“[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to satisfy
Article III.”156 The Third Circuit quickly concluded that Plaintiffs
“allegations of hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to
establish standing.”157 Furthermore, they indicated that to
succeed, the Plaintiffs must have alleged, and later proved, that
the hacker, “(1) read, copied, and understood their personal
information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts by
misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information
to the detriment of [Plaintiffs] by making unauthorized
transactions in [Plaintiffs’] names.”158
In its rationale, the Third Circuit distinguishes this case from
two similar cases where sister circuits had found standing:
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp159 and Krottner v. Starbucks
Corp.160.161 The Third Circuit attempted to differentiate itself from
Pisciotta by saying, “there was evidence that the hacker’s intrusion
was sophisticated, intentional and malicious [in that case].”162 The
Third Circuit then ruled that this was not present here.163 In
Krottner, there was an attempt “to open a bank account with a
plaintiff’s information following the physical theft of a laptop.”164
Again, the Third Circuit ruled this was not present here.165
153. Id. at 41.
154. Id.
155. See id. (“Constitutional standing requires an injury-in-fact, which is an
invasion of a legally protected interest.”).
156. Id. at 42 (internal citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
160. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
161. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43–44 (explaining how Pisciotta and Krottner are
different than the case at hand).
162. Id. at 44 (citing Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632).
163. See id. (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or
malicious.”).
164. Id. (citing Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142).
165. See id. (“[Plaintiffs] have alleged no misuse.”).
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Lastly, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that Plaintiffs’
purchase of identity theft protection is sufficient injury.166 Instead,
the Third Circuit explained it away as merely “[Plaintiffs]
prophylactically spen[ding] money to ease fears of future
third-party criminality.”167 Ultimately, the Third Circuit
concluded, in affirming the district court’s dismissal: “[T]here is no
quantifiable risk of damage in the future . . . . Any damages that
may occur here are entirely speculative and dependent on the skill
and intent of the hacker.”168
B. Cases that Find Standing
1. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp.169
Multiple Circuit Courts have come to the opposite opinion of
the Fourth, Eighth, and Third Circuits regarding whether
increased risk of identity theft is enough of an injury in these types
of cases.170 In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., hackers
breached Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s firewall and
accessed personal information.171 This personal information
included names, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders,
occupations, employers, social security numbers, and driver’s
license numbers.172 Plaintiffs brought suit and alleged that the
Nationwide breach created an “imminent, immediate and
continuing risk” that Plaintiffs and other class members would be
subject to identity fraud.173 Indeed, Plaintiffs pointed to a study
that concluded, “in 2011 recipients of data-breach notifications
166. See id. at 45 (“Although [Plaintiffs] have incurred expenses to monitor
their accounts and to protect their personal and financial information from
imminent misuse and/or identity theft, they have not done so as a result of any
actual injury.”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., 63 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir.
2016).
170. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (listing the circuit
split).
171. Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 386.
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were 9.6 times more likely to experience identity fraud, and had a
fraud incidence rate of 19%.”174 Beyond that, Plaintiffs alleged that
they wanted to mitigate this risk of identity fraud by paying an
average of $354 in out-of-pocket expenses and $1513 in total
economic loss to obtain identity theft protection.175 It was through
these two major reasons—increased risk of future injury and the
mitigation costs to avoid such future injury—that Plaintiffs
claimed they had satisfied the constitutional requirements of
standing.176 The district court rejected these arguments and the
Plaintiffs appealed their case to the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the
principles of constitutional standing, taking particular note of the
injury requirement.177 The court also took particular note of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding when future injury
satisfies the injury requirement of constitutional standing.178 With
this in mind, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “Plaintiffs’
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably
incurred mitigation costs, are sufficient to establish a cognizable
Article III injury at the pleading stage of litigation.”179 The Sixth
Circuit pointed out that there is a presumption that when
information is stolen, it is presumed that it will be used for
nefarious purposes, such as stealing someone’s identity.180
Consequently, even though the injury is not “literally certain,”
there is a “sufficiently substantial risk of harm” that the injury will
occur.181
With the injury requirement satisfied, the Sixth Circuit moved
to the other two requirements of constitutional standing:

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 386–87.
177. See id. at 388 (“Injury is the first and foremost of standing’s three
elements.”) (internal citation omitted).
178. See id. (explaining that a substantial risk that future harm will occur is
sufficient to fulfil constitutional standing).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 388, 389 (“There is no need for speculation where Plaintiffs
allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of
ill-intentioned criminals . . . . Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or
later, to make a fraudulent charge or assume those consumers’ identities.”).
181. Id. at 388.
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Causation and redressability.182 The court, however, quickly flew
through those two requirements and concluded they were
satisfied.183 The Sixth Circuit then reversed the district court’s
determination that Plaintiffs did not have standing and
remanded.184
2. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC185
The Seventh Circuit also discussed a similar legal issue in
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC.186 The facts of that case
are as follows. Sometime in 2013, hackers attacked Neiman
Marcus Group, LLC [hereinafter “NMG”] and stole some of their
customers’ credit card information.187 In December of that year,
NMG learned of fraudulent charges showing up on some of its
customers’ credit cards.188 However, NMG kept that information
confidential until January the following year.189 The company then
announced that around 350,000 cards had been exposed and
approximately 9,200 had already been fraudulently used.190 The
Plaintiffs here quickly filed suit.191 The district court dismissed the
claim for want of standing.192 Plaintiffs appealed.193
The Seventh Circuit undertook the same analysis as the Sixth
Circuit had taken regarding the increased chance of both future
injury and current injury.194 In regard to the heightened risk of
182. See id. at 390–91 (explaining that the injury must be caused by the
defendants and a favorable decision must be able to redress the injury).
183. See id. (explaining that Plaintiff’s injury was caused by the defendant
and a favorable decision would redress the injury).
184. See id. (“Thus, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaints adequately allege
Article III standing.”).
185. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
186. See id. at 689–70 (finding that the plaintiff’s showing of a substantial
risk of harm from the store’s data breach satisfied Article III’s injury
requirement).
187. Id. at 689.
188. Id. at 690.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 692 (“These plaintiffs must allege that the data breach
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future injury, the Seventh Circuit came to a number of conclusions,
including:
[R]equiring the plaintiffs to wait for the threatened harm to
materialize in order to sue would create a different problem:
[T]he more time that passes between a data breach and an
instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to
argue that the identity theft is not fairly traceable to the
defendant’s data breach.195

The court then noted a Government Accountability Office
Report which concluded that “stolen data may be held for up to a
year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further,
once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent
use of that information may continue for years.”196 So, the fact that
only 9,200 cards have been compromised so far does not preclude
the significant possibility that more could be injured in the
future.197 For these reasons, coupled with the presumption that the
hacker’s intentions were nefarious, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that there is sufficient injury to grant standing under the
“certainly impending” test.198
The Seventh Circuit, however, continued to analyze if
Plaintiffs’ purchasing of identity theft protection was sufficient.199
The court noted that “[p]laintiffs cannot manufacture standing by
incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.”200
However, as noted above, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
future harm was imminent; therefore, these mitigation costs also
constitute sufficient injury to confer standing.201
inflicted . . . injury on them; that [Defendant] caused that injury; and that a
judicial decision can provide redress for them.”).
195. Id. at 693.
196. Id. at 694.
197. See id. (“[T]he complaint asserts that fraudulent charges and identity
theft can occur long after a data breach.”).
198. See id. at 693 (“[P]laintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from
the [Defendant’s] data breach. Why else would hackers break into a store’s
database and steal consumers’ private information?”).
199. See id. at 694 (“In addition to the alleged future injures, the plaintiffs
assert that they have already lost time and money protecting themselves against
future identity theft and fraudulent charges.”).
200. Id.
201. See id. (“An affected customer, having been notified by Neiman Marcus
that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe to a service that
offers monthly credit monitoring.”).
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Lastly, the Seventh Circuit mentioned an issue that every
other case had not even addressed: Is private information
property?202 While the Seventh Circuit bypassed the question and
dismisses it because the Plaintiffs did not provide any authority
that would support such a conclusion, it is an interesting
proposition.203
3. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.204
The Ninth Circuit dealt with an analogous legal issue in
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.205 The facts of that case are as follows.
In October 2008, someone stole a laptop from Starbucks that
contained the unencrypted names, addresses, and social security
numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.206 In
November of that year, Starbucks sent a letter to those affected,
alerting them to the theft and stating that Starbucks had “no
indication that the private information had been misused.”207
However, Starbucks still told those affected to closely monitor their
financial accounts for suspicious activity and provided credit watch
services for the next year.208 Two of the Plaintiffs continued to pay
out-of-pocket for continued credit watch services after the one year
of free service concluded and, arguably because of the continued
surveillance, they had not yet suffered any sort of identity theft at
the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.209 Indeed, there was an
attempt to open a bank account in one of the Plaintiff’s name and
social security number, but the bank closed the account before any
damage could be done.210 Plaintiffs then brought a class action
202. See id. at 695 (“The plaintiffs also allege that they have a concrete injury
in the loss of their private information, which they characterize as an intangible
commodity.”).
203. See id. (“Plaintiffs refer us to no authority that would support such a
finding. We thus refrain from supporting standing on such an abstract injury.”).
204. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
205. See id. at 1142 (“Plaintiffs-Appellants’ remaining allegations concern
their increased risk of future identity theft.”).
206. Id. at 1140.
207. Id. at 1140–41.
208. See id. at 1141 (referencing a letter Starbucks sent out to those affected).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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against Starbucks.211 The district court dismissed the complaint
for failing to allege a cognizable injury under law.212 Plaintiffs
appealed.213
The Ninth Circuit began by reanalyzing the district court’s
determination of Article III standing.214 Again, the court focused
on the injury requirement.215 In particular, whether the increased
risk of future identity theft is sufficient even though there has not
been any actual loss yet.216 The court compared this increased risk
of future harm to environmental and toxic exposure claims, which
have legally similar injuries to data breach cases due to a delay in
occurrence and some uncertainty that injury will ever occur.217
Ultimately,
the
Ninth
Circuit
concluded
that
“Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing
their unencrypted personal data.”218 However, the Ninth Circuit
qualified this result by indicating that if the allegations were more
conjectural or hypothetical, such as if the laptop had not been
stolen, but it had been at risk of being stolen at some point, there
would be no standing.219
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. (“We have an independent obligation to examine standing to
determine whether it comports with the case or controversy requirement of
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.”).
215. See id. at 1141–42 (“It was undisputed before the district court that
Plaintiffs-Appellants had sufficiently alleged causation and redressability, the
second and third standing requirements. We thus turn to the first standing
requirement: [W]hether Plaintiffs-Appellants adequately alleged an
injury-in-fact.”).
216. See id. at 1142 (explaining the arguments by Plaintiff trying to establish
standing).
217. See id. (concluding that environmental and toxic exposure claims are
similar because, like the current case, the injury is neither occurring presently
nor guaranteed to ever occur, but the increased likelihood to cause future injury
is sufficient to grant standing) (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States,
306 F.3d 938, 948–50 (9th Cir. 2002) (adjudicating an environmental claim) &
Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating a
toxic exposure claim)).
218. Id. at 1143.
219. See id. (“Were Plaintiffs-Appellants’ allegations more conjectural or
hypothetical—for example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had sued
based on the risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future—we would
find the threat far less credible.”).
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4. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.220

The most recent circuit court to deal with this legal issue was
the D.C. Circuit in Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.221 In that case, health
insurer CareFirst, Inc. suffered a cyberattack in which its
customers’ personal information was allegedly stolen.222 This
personal information included names, birthdates, email addresses,
social security numbers, and credit card information.223 The attack
occurred in June 2014, and the breach was discovered in April
2015.224 The affected individuals were then informed of the breach
in May, 2015.225 Plaintiffs soon after brought a class action lawsuit
against CareFirst, alleging a number of different causes of
action.226 The district court dismissed the complaint for want of
standing.227 The Plaintiffs quickly filed an appeal.228
The D.C. Circuit began by highlighting the injury-in-fact
requirement of constitutional standing.229 Specifically, whether
the future injury alleged by Plaintiffs is “actual or imminent”
enough to confer standing.230 For that, the D.C. Circuit focused on
the “substantial risk” test.231
Courts around the country have separately molded the various
future injury tests that the Supreme Court discussed in Clapper
and its progeny.232 In the D.C. Circuit, the appropriate method of
analyzing an “increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the
220. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
221. See generally id. (grappling with the legal question of whether data
breaches are sufficient to grant standing to those affected).
222. Id. at 622.
223. Id. at 623.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 626 (“This case primarily concerns the injury-in-fact
requirement.”).
230. Id. (“An injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and, most
importantly for our purposes, ‘actual or imminent’ rather than speculative.”)
(internal citations omitted).
231. See id. at 627 (discussing the “substantial risk” test of injury).
232. See, e.g., id. (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s precedent regarding the
“substantial risk” test); see also cases cited supra notes 72–75 and accompanying
text (explaining the various future injury-in-fact tests).
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ultimate alleged harm,’ which in this case would be identity theft,
‘as the . . . injury[,] and then to determine whether the increased
risk of such harm makes injury to an individual citizen sufficiently
imminent for standing purposes.’”233 Accordingly, the inquiry then
turned to whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that there is a
“substantial risk of identity theft as a result of defendant’s alleged
negligence.”234 The D.C. Circuit analyzed the complaint and
concluded that there is “[n]o long sequence of uncertain
contingencies involving multiple independent actors [that must]
occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any harm.”235 The
D.C. Circuit continues, stating, “simply by virtue of the hack and
the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was
taken . . . . [Plaintiffs] satisfy the requirement of an injury in
fact.”236 With the injury requirement satisfied, the D.C. Circuit
quickly disposed of the other standing requirements and ruled that
the Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.237
III. Why Courts Should Find the Increased Threat of Future
Injury Justifies Standing in These Types of Cases
In Beck, In re SuperValu, Inc., and Reilly (“Non-Standing
Cases”) there were two common threads of error that Galaria,
Remijas, Krottner, and Attias (“Standing Cases”) do not have.
First, the Non-Standing Cases’ incorrectly assumed that hackers’
intent may not be malicious.238 Second, the Non-Standing Cases
improperly focused on the whether any identity theft has occurred,
rather than focusing on the complexities of the hacking attack.239
233. Id. (quoting Food & Water Watch v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir.
2015)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 629.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 629–30. (describing why the plaintiffs have standing).
238. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs
have uncovered no evidence that . . . the thief stole the laptop with the intent to
steal their private information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769
(8th Cir. 2017) (requiring Plaintiffs to specifically allege that their information
was stolen instead of presuming it); Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir.
2011) (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or
malicious.”).
239. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (focusing on whether future identity theft has
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Instead, the hacking event, by itself, should confer a presumption
that there is a sufficiently increased chance of future injury so as
to grant standing.
A. Courts Should Presume that the Hacker is Planning to Misuse
the Stolen Data Because Hacking Is a Difficult and Illegal
Activity
Turning to the first common error, the Non-Standing Cases
failed to assume that the hacker had ill-intent in stealing the
information.240 This is incorrect.
Hacking a database, particularly overcoming the high level of
security the defendants in these cases presumably apply, is
especially difficult.241 Two of the most common types of attacks
utilized for this special purpose are brute force attacks and trojan
viruses.242 Both of these methods are neither cheap nor simple,
requiring a large investment of time.243
occurred); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769–71 (discussing the
potential future injury from the hacking); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43 (same).
240. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (“[P]laintiffs have uncovered no evidence
that . . . . [T]he thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private
information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769 (requiring Plaintiffs
to specifically allege that their information was stolen before beginning a
standing analysis); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44 (“Here, there is no evidence that the
intrusion was intentional or malicious.”).
241. See CESAR CERRUDO & ESTEBAN MARTINEZ FAYO, HACKING DATABASES FOR
OWNING YOUR DATA 4–6 (2007), https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bheurope-07/Cerrudo/Whitepaper/bh-eu-07-cerrudo-WP-up.pdf (explaining the
various ways that hackers illegally access databases and the difficulty of
performing such hacks) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
242. See id. at 4–5 (describing how databases are hacked and different
methods that hackers use).
243. See How to Crack Passwords, Part 1 (Principles & Technologies), NULL
BYTE (May 26, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hacklike-pro-crack-passwords-part-1-principles-technologies-0156136/
[hereinafter
How to Crack Passwords] (describing how expensive and complicated brute force
attacks are) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also SebastianZ, Security 1:1 - Part 2 - Trojans and Other Security
Threats, SYMANTEC (Dec. 26, 2013), https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/
security-11-part-2-trojans-and-other-threats (“Trojans are generally created by
malware authors who are organized and aim to make money out of their efforts.
These types of Trojans can be highly sophisticated and can require more work to
implement than some of the simpler malware seen on the Internet.”) (on file with
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A brute force attack is a term used to reference an illegal
retrieval of passwords.244 It has a simple premise: Attempt all
possible combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols until the
correct password is found.245 However, this attack is not always an
attempt to discover the actual database password, as enterprises
generally have security against this, but rather, it is generally an
attempt to decrypt the password file.246 This type of brute force
attack is called “breaking the hash.”247 Put another way, let us say
you are attempting to break into a vault.248 This vault requires a
key to enter.249 If you tried to pick the vault lock a million times,
the lock would break and restrict access to the vault.250 However,
next to the entrance of the vault is a safe containing the key
necessary to enter the vault.251 So, you decide to take the safe home
and attempt to find the combination.252 You try every single
combination on the safe and, eventually, it clicks open to reveal the
key inside.253 You take the key and enter the vault.254 This is,
conceptually, how a “breaking the hash” brute force attack is
performed.255 The vault is the database that contains the personal
information the hackers seek.256 The key is the password needed
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
244. See How to Crack Passwords, supra note 243 (describing what brute force
attacks are and how they occur).
245. See id. (“Brute force password cracking attempts all possibilities of all
the letters, number, special characters that might be combined for a password
and attempts them.”).
246. See id. (describing methods of “cracking” passwords).
247. See Introduction to Cracking MD5 Encryption—Breaking the Hash
Functions,
BREAKING
THE
SECURITY
(Feb.
16,
2011),
http://breakthesecurity.cysecurity.org/2011/02/introduction-to-cracking-md5encryption- breaking-the-hash-functions.html (explaining the term “breaking the
hash”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
248. Cf. How to Crack Passwords, supra note 243 (describing what brute force
attacks are and how they occur).
249. Cf. id. (same).
250. Cf. id. (same).
251. Cf. id. (describing how a password is protected).
252. Cf. id. (referencing how hackers work to decode passwords).
253. Cf. id. (noting the process hackers use).
254. Cf. id. (same).
255. Cf. id. (same).
256. Cf. id. (same).
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to open the database.257 The safe protecting the key is the
encryption utilized on the password.258 Lastly, the combination to
open the safe is the encryption key to decrypt the sought after
database password.259 While this is just one type of brute force
attack, this analogy shows that the execution of any brute force
attack is incredibly complex.260
On top of the intricacy of a brute force attack, it is also
expensive and time consuming.261 Most passwords today are
encrypted with 256-bit encryption.262 The number “256” refers to
the size of the encryption key, or the length of the “combination,”
using the analogy above.263 Put numerically, there are 2256 possible
combinations that the decryption “combination” could be.264 With
that many possible combinations, a hacker could not feasibly sit
for years and type each one in. Instead, the hacker would either
download software to do it for her or, if she is sophisticated enough,
develop her own software.265 Regardless, she then needs the raw
computing power to run the software quickly, so as to make the
“decryption” process efficient enough to be valuable.266 Amateur
hackers will usually purchase bot nets, which spread the
processing power over millions of machines, or purchase
257. Cf. id. (same).
258. Cf. id. (same).
259. Cf. id. (same).
260. See id. (explaining the complexity of brute force attacks).
261. See id. (describing the cost and time investment required to effectuate a
brute force attack).
262. See David Bisson, The Evolution of 256-bit Encryption and Security
Certificates, VENAFI (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.venafi.com/blog/evolution-256bit-encryption-and-security-certificates (“Most organizations require their
employees use AES 256-bit encryption.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
263. See 256-Bit Encryption, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/29703/256-bit-encryption (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (“256-bit
encryption is refers to the length of the encryption key used to encrypt a data
stream or file”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
264. See id. (“A hacker or cracker will require 2256 different combinations to
break a 256-bit encrypted message.”).
265. See How to Crack Passwords, NULL BYTE, supra note 243 (listing the
various software packages available to wannabe hackers, including “John the
Ripper,” “Ophcrack,” and many others)
266. See id. (describing how much computer power is necessary to effectuate
a brute force hack).
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specialized equipment.267 Both of these options are incredibly
expensive.268 For example, Black Arrow Software produces a
special device that performs these type of brute force attacks.269 It
costs $350,000.270 Consequently, the time and money investment
to attack major corporations can be massive.271 Because of this,
very few individuals will attempt to hack enterprises unless they
are seeking profit, either by selling the information to the highest
bidder or the company is paying them to test the security.
The other database attack strategy mentioned above is to
install a trojan horse virus within the system.272 A trojan horse
virus takes its name from the mythical trojan horse in the Iliad.273
Like the mythical “horse,” the virus presents itself as something
familiar and attempts to remain undetected until activated by the
hacker.274 When the virus gets activated, it can do a number of
things, depending on what its creator intends for it to do.275 This
could include opening a backdoor for the hacker, giving the hacker
unfettered access to the network; scanning the system for
passwords and valuable information; logging key strokes; and
more.276
267. See id. (listing the possible ways that wannabe hackers will increase
their computer power).
268. See,
e.g.,
Scrypt
ASICs,
BLACK
ARROW
INFO.
TECH.,
http://www.blackarrowsoftware.com/store/litecoin-asics/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2018) (listing their brute force specialized machine for $350,000) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
269. See id. (same).
270. See id. (same).
271. See, e.g., id. (same).
272. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (listing the most popular methods
by which hackers illicitly access databases).
273. See Trojan Horse Definition, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/
definition/trojanhorse (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (defining the term “trojan horse”
in the computer virus context) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
274. See id. (“Trojan horses are software programs that masquerade as
regular programs, such as games, disk utilities, and even antivirus programs. But
if they are run, these programs can do malicious things to your computer.”).
275. See id. (detailing ways the trojan horse can infiltrate software).
276. See, e.g., JAMIE CRAPANZANO, DECONSTRUCTING SUBSEVEN, THE TROJAN
HORSE OF CHOICE 3 (2003) https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/
malicious/deconstructing-subseven-the-trojan-horse-of-choice-953 (detailing the
Trojan Horse SubSeven’s capabilities including, turning on webcams, abort
programs, and usurp instant messaging services) (on file with the Washington &
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As one could imagine, these trojan horse viruses are
complicated to create and utilize.277 The virus’ code must account
for the target’s antivirus system278, and, with large enterprises,
these antivirus systems are usually advanced.279 So, to counteract
these heightened antiviruses, a trojan horse viruse would have to
be coded to mutate itself into something else once it was
downloaded onto the target computer so as to avoid detection.280
This is known as polymorphic coding.281 The sophistication of this
coding generally requires that the code be custom-made for the
hacker’s target.282 All of this takes significant amounts of time and
skill.283 Like with brute force attacks, the requisite costs involved
in a trojan horse attack indicate that hackers who illicitly gain
access to enterprise databases through trojan horse viruses
presumptively intend to misuse the compromised data.
These two methods of attack are not the only ways by which a
hacker could illegally access databases, but are some of the most
common methods.284 However, like the two examples presented
above, each type of attack requires immense knowledge, time, and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
277. See SebastianZ, supra note 243 (“Trojans are generally created by
malware authors who are organized and aim to make money out of their efforts.
These types of Trojans can be highly sophisticated and can require more work to
implement than some of the simpler malware seen on the Internet.”).
278. Antivirus systems are incredibly complex, but they all distill down to
comparing files or parts of files to known virus signatures. See Chris Hoffman,
How Antivirus Software
Work, HOW-TO-GEEK
(Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.howtogeek.com/125650/htg-explains-how-antivirus-software-works/
(describing how anti-virus systems work) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
279. See AVAST SOFTWARE, INC., AVAST BUSINESS ENDPOINT PROTECTION
SOLUTIONS - WINDOWS, 1–2 (2017) (listing the various enterprise antivirus
capabilities).
280. See Polymorphic Virus, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/4055/polymorphic-virus (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (“A polymorphic
virus is a complicated computer virus that affects data types and functions. It is
a self-encrypted virus designed to avoid detection by a scanner. Upon infection,
the polymorphic virus duplicates itself by creating usable, albeit slightly modified,
copies of itself.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
281. See id. (defining polymorphic viruses).
282. Id.
283. See id. (same).
284. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (listing the most popular methods
by which hackers illicitly access databases).
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money.285 The difficulty and costs alone should indicate ill-intent
when someone unlawfully accesses confidential databases.286
Notwithstanding that, the Non-Standing Cases’ opinions seems to
imply that the hackers could have accidentally accessed this
information.287 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Beck specifically
stated, “the . . . Plaintiffs have uncovered no evidence that
the . . . thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private
information.”288 It is unclear how the Plaintiffs in that case would
have proven such a fact—being that the hacker was not known at
the time—but, because of that, the Fourth Circuit ruled that there
was no standing.289 The Eight Circuit likewise concluded so in In
re SuperValu, Inc.290
In Reilly, the Third Circuit egregiously focused on this false
conclusion.291 Again, the court in Reilly stated that on
approximately December 22, 2009, “Ceridian suffered a security
breach. An unknown hacker infiltrated Ceridian’s Powerpay
system and potentially gained access to personal and financial
information belonging to Appellants and approximately 27,000
employees at 1,900 companies. It is not known whether the hacker
read, copied, or understood the data.”292 The Third Circuit then
285. See id. (highlighting the difficulty of hacking corporate databases).
286. Cf. id. (same).
287. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs
have uncovered no evidence that . . . the thief stole the laptop with the intent to
steal their private information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769
(8th Cir. 2017) (requiring Plaintiffs to specifically allege that their information
was stolen instead of presuming it); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d
Cir. 2011) (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or
malicious.”).
288. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
289. See id. at 276 (concluding that for Plaintiffs to suffer harm, there must
be an attenuated chain of events by third parties; this defeats standing).
290. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[O]thers
have ruled that a complaint could plausibly plead that the theft of a plaintiff’s
personal or financial information [inherently] creates a substantial risk that they
will suffer identity theft sufficient to constitute a[n] . . . injury . . . we conclude
that plaintiffs have not done so here.”).
291. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (“Appellants’ contentions rely on speculation
that the hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their personal information;
(2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is
able to use such information to the detriment of appellants by making
unauthorized transactions in Appellants’ names.”).
292. Id. at 40.
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noted that Ceridian’s own investigation determined that the threat
was sufficient enough to send out letters to the affected
individuals.293 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that
plaintiffs do not have standing because it is only “speculation” to
think that the hacker got the information and then wanted to
abuse it.294 Ultimately, the Third Circuit said, “[a]ny damages that
may occur here are entirely speculative and dependent on the skill
and intent of the hacker,” even though the hackers clearly had
enough skill to hack Ceridian’s database to begin with.295
In the Non-Standing Cases, the courts’ failures to presume
that the hackers had ill-intent in hacking the various defendants’
databases is incorrect, given the difficulty and costs of hacking.296
Further buttressing this point, hacking itself is illegal.297 While it
remains theoretically possible that the hacker(s) in the
Non-Standing Cases had no ill-intent; logically, this possibility is
vastly outweighed by the large probability that the hacker(s) do
have ill-intent. Why else would the hackers go to the trouble of
performing the hack and expose themselves to criminal liability?
The Seventh Circuit in Remijas put it well: “Why else would
hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private
information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or
later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’
identities.”298
The procedural burden that some courts thrust upon
prospective plaintiffs to prove that the hacker both copied and
plans to misuse the data is not only unnecessary, as shown
above,299 it presents a nearly insurmountable burden. To prove
293. See id. (“Ceridian sent letters to the potential identity theft victims,
informing them of the breach . . . .”).
294. See id. at 42 (“Appellants’ contentions rely on speculation that the
hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to
commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use
such information to the detriment of appellants by making unauthorized
transactions in Appellants’ names.”).
295. Id. at 45.
296. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (explaining the difficulties
associated with hacking).
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (stating that knowingly hacking without
authorization is illegal).
298. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
299. See supra notes 241–88 and accompanying text (indicating that courts
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that the hacker stole information, much less plans to misuse it, the
plaintiffs would, at the very least, need access to the servers that
were hacked.300 They would then need to have an expert go over
the data and see if there are any traces of copying left.301
Sometimes there may not be.302 The largest obstacle, however, is
that they would need all of this before they got through the court
doors.303 The prospective plaintiffs would not have civil discovery
powers, and the company is certainly incentivized to block access
to avoid a lawsuit.304 Either way, the plaintiffs are left penniless
and holding the bag for something that they had nothing to do with
and could not have stopped, even if they tried.
The Standing Cases’ courts agreed with this argument.305 The
Sixth Circuit said in Galaria, “[w]here a data breach targets
personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
should presume that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise
database).
300. See How Do I Know if My Server has Been Hacked, SERVERPRONTO: U.
(July 08, 2015), https://www.serverpronto.com/spu/2015/07/how-do-i-know-if-myserver-has-been-hacked/ (listing the ways that someone can tell if her server has
been hacked, all of which require access to the server) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
301. See id. (“The truth, though, is that usually when you’re hacked, there’s
no obvious sign. Hackers work hard to ensure their victims are unaware of what
has happened until it’s too late, if ever.”).
302. See Kraft Kennedy, TeraCopy Forensics: Finding the Elusive “Copy Log”,
KRAFT KENNEDY (April 25, 2017), https://www.kraftkennedy.com/teracopyforensics-finding-elusive-copy-log/ (indicating that evidence of copying files from
a server can disappear quickly) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
303. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1979) (addressing preliminary
questions of standing before addressing the merits of the case, even though
neither party challenged standing).
304. Cf. id. (same).
305. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 388 (6th
Cir. 2016) (“Where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable
inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data
for . . . fraudulent purposes.”); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,
794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have
shown a substantial risk of harm from the . . . data breach.”); Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs-Appellants have
alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of
a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.,
865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] substantial risk of harm exists already,
simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege
was taken.”).
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hackers will use the victims’ data for . . . fraudulent purposes.”306
The Seventh Circuit similarly stated in Remijas, “it is plausible to
infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from
the . . . data breach.”307 The Ninth Circuit also ruled similarly in
Krottner, “Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of
real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop
containing their unencrypted personal data.”308 Lastly, in Attias,
the D.C. Circuit also agreed, saying, “a substantial risk of harm
exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the
data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”309
Courts should conclude that when there is a major hack of an
enterprise, there is a presumption that the hacker not only stole
the accessed data, but also plans to misuse it.310 This could, of
course, be rebutted by the defendant enterprises, but the burden
should be on them.311 They alone possess the information capable
to do this.312 This presumption would grant standing in data
breach cases—unless the defendant rebuts this presumption—by
satisfying the U.S. Supreme Court’s tests regarding risk of future
injury.313 There is no attenuated chain of possible future actions by
a third party that would cause actual injury; there is a very real
and almost inevitable chance that someone will have her identity
stolen due to the data breach.314

306. Galaria, 663 F. App’x 3d. at 388.
307. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
308. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143.
309. Attias, 865 F.3d at 629.
310. See supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database).
311. See id. (same).
312. See How Do I Know if My Server has Been Hacked, SERVERPRONTO, supra
note 302 (listing the ways that someone can tell if her server has been hacked, all
of which require access to the server).
313. Cf. supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database).
314. Cf. id. (same).
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B. Courts Should Focus on the Actual Hacking Event to
Determine Injury, Rather than If the Future Injury has Occurred
In the Non-Standing Cases, the Circuit Courts focus on
whether there has been an actual identity theft at the time of the
suit.315 The Third Circuit explicitly states this, saying, “[i]n data
breach cases where no misuse is alleged . . . there has been no
injury.”316 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits similarly ruled.317
These courts are not focusing on the correct injury. There are two
reasons why: (1) The issue at hand is not whether the plaintiffs’
identity was stolen, but that plaintiffs’ data was stolen from the
defendant entities; and (2) focusing on the question of whether a
plaintiff’s identity has been stolen creates a circular logic loop out
of which plaintiffs could never break. In the Standing Cases, the
circuit courts all came to this conclusion.318
Courts generally only worry themselves with the two parties
before them.319 With that logic, courts will only focus on the actions
of the parties before them in adjudicating any dispute.320 Yet, in
315. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs
make no such claims [of misuse]. This in turn renders their contention of an
enhanced risk of future identity theft too speculative.”); see also In re SuperValu,
Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769–71 (8th Cir. 2017) (focusing on whether future identity
theft has occurred); Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Appellants
have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no injury.”).
316. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45.
317. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (explaining that Plaintiffs make no claims of
misuse or certainly impending misuse of Plaintiffs’ personal information,
defeating plaintiffs’ standing); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769–71
(focusing on whether future identity theft as occurred).
318. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 391 (6th
Cir. 2016) (finding that Plaintiffs have standing to sue when focusing on the
hacking injury); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688,
693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a
substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”); Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs-Appellants have
alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of
a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.,
865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“No long sequence of uncertain
contingencies . . . has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any
harm; a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and
the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”).
319. Cf., e.g., Gordon v. Biden, 606 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2009)
(dismissing a case because the injury was attributable to third-party actions
which were not before the court).
320. Cf. id. (same).
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these types of cases, the Non-Standing Cases required the hackers
to have acted in a particular way at the time of the litigation for
there to be sufficient injury to grant standing.321 This goes against
the logic that courts generally follow and against the adversarial
process.322 Courts should, instead, focus on actions that defendants
took or did not take that put plaintiffs in the position they sit.
Turning to the second reason, as mentioned several times in
this note, there are three requirements for standing: Injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability.323 While the bulk of this note has
focused on the injury aspect of the tripartite standing scheme, if
courts analyze the injury in these types of cases to only exist if
their identity had been stolen at the outset of litigation, the
question then becomes: Did the defendant entity cause the identity
theft? While the Supreme Court has implied that the causation
element of standing is not as strict as needed to create liability in
tort, it is still a necessary element of standing.324 If the harmed
individuals must wait until they are hurt before being able to sue,
it becomes an almost insurmountable burden to plead and later
prove the causation element.325 The Seventh Circuit in Remijas
noted this exact problem:
Requiring the plaintiffs “to wait for the threatened harm to
materialize in order to sue” would create a different problem:
“[T]he more time that passes between a data breach and an
instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to

321. See cases cited supra note 315 and accompanying text (listing how the
Non-Standing Cases’ courts focused on whether the plaintiffs’ identities had been
stolen).
322. Cf. Gordon, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (dismissing a case because the injury
was attributable to third-party actions which were not before the court).
323. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . . Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must
be likely, as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.”).
324. Cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
125–26, 134 (finding that the causation element of standing was satisfied, but
defendant’s actions may not have proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries).
325. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs).
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argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the
defendant’s data breach.”326

Consequently, if courts force plaintiffs to wait until the future
injury occurs, the causation element of standing becomes more
tenuous.327 However, if courts were to focus on the actual hack
instead, the Non-Standing Cases’ courts would rule that there is
no injury.328 Either way, the plaintiffs would not have standing.
This circular logic would continue to go around and around, leaving
injured plaintiffs without redress. The only way to escape the loop
is to focus on the data breach and conclude—like the circuit courts
which decided the Standing Cases did—that the significantly
increased chance of future injury is sufficient injury to satisfy
constitutional standing.329
Reiterating this logic, the Government Accountability Office
issued a report that stated, “stolen data may be held up to a year
or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once
stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of
that information may continue for years.”330 This precisely
illuminates the danger of waiting for the actual future injury to
occur: If the plaintiffs must wait for the damage, they could be
waiting for years.331 As the Seventh Circuit notes, “‘the more time
that passes between a data breach and an instance of identity
theft, the more latitude a defendant has to argue that the identity
theft is not “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s data breach.’”332
Ultimately, courts analyzing this issue should focus on the hacking
326. Id. at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197,
1215 n. 5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014)).
327. See id. (noting the difficulty in proving causation if the court waits until
the hack occurs).
328. Cf. cases cited supra notes 319–27 and accompanying text (discussing
the Non-Standing Case courts’ focus on whether there has been an actual identity
theft at the time of the suit).
329. See cases cited supra notes 305–109 and accompanying text (highlighting
the Standing Cases courts’ presuming that the hacker has ill intent due to the
nature of the hack).
330. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-07-737, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007).
331. See id. (describing how long it could take after a data breach for
someone’s identity to be taken).
332. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n. 5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 4, 2014))).
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event itself in determining where there is standing, not by what
the hackers have done with the data at that point.
C. Conclusion
The courts should presume that a hacker not only accessed
compromised information, but also stole and plans to misuse that
information. While the defendant could always rebut the
presumption with evidence to the contrary, putting the procedural
burden upon plaintiffs makes it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
get through the doors of the courthouse.333 This leaves the injured
individuals, whose information is exposed, without redress.334
The courts should also not require plaintiffs to sit and wait for
the third-party hacker to actually steal identities before plaintiffs
can enter the courtroom.335 Otherwise, courts would in essence be
ruling that defendants could not be liable until a third-party acts;
a conclusion that is contrary to the American legal system.336 Such
a conclusion would also create circular logic: There could not be
standing due to lack of injury until the third-party acts337;
however, if the third-party hackers do act, it would make the
causation element of standing difficult to prove at best.338 These
requirements the Non-Standing Cases’ courts have erected cannot
be correct. Instead, courts that analyze this issue should not pay
attention to whether identity theft has yet occurred but should use
the presumption explained above: The hack itself indicates a
sufficient risk of future injury to constitute standing.

333. See supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database).
334. Cf. id. (same).
335. See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text (arguing that the hacking
event is sufficient, and plaintiffs should not be forced to sit and wait for the injury
to materialize).
336. Cf. id. (same).
337. See id. (same).
338. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs).
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IV. Alternatives to Satisfy the Injury-in-Fact Requirement
A. Breach of Privacy
Common law has long protected a person’s right to privacy,
but the lines have not been clearly delineated.339 The Second
Restatement of Torts [hereinafter “Restatement”] attempted to
clear up this ambiguity by stating that the “right of privacy has
been defined as the right to be let alone.”340 Furthermore, the
Restatement made four separate causes of action that revolved
around this theoretical “right to privacy”: Intrusion upon seclusion,
appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life,
and publicity placing a person in a false light.341
Of the ones listed above, the most applicable cause of action
for these types of data breach cases is an intrusion upon
seclusion.342 The Restatement states, “[o]ne who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”343 It is important to note
that the comments clearly explain that this “invasion” does not
need to be physical, but can be done by using someone’s senses,
with or without a mechanical aid.344 This cause of action also does
not turn upon whether there was publicity given to the stolen
material.345
339. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(explaining the history of a common law right to privacy).
340. Id.
341. See id. at § 652A (“The right of privacy is invaded by unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . . or . . . appropriation of the other's
name or likeness . . . unreasonable publicity given to the other's private
life . . . or . . . publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public.”).
342. Cf. id. at § 652B (defining an intrusion into seclusion as an invasion into
private affairs, such as stealing personal information).
343. Id.
344. See id. at § 652B cmt. b (“The invasion may be by physical intrusion . . . .
It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical
aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”).
345. See id. at § 652B cmt. a (“The form of invasion of privacy covered by this
Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is
invaded or to his affairs.”).
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Following this logic and applying those legal principles, if you,
hypothetically, were to have your bank account information—
which was written on a piece of paper and stored within a safe in
your house—stolen, but the paper left in the safe, you have a cause
of action for intrusion into seclusion.346 Beyond that, you would
have sufficient injury to pursue a claim against the safe
manufacturer if the safe was defective and allowed the criminal to
steal your bank account number.347 However, when that same
exact information is stolen from a bank’s servers, the
Non-Standing Cases’ courts would say that you have no standing
to sue the bank that may have negligently allowed the hacker to
take the information.348 This is illogical and should not remain.
While the exact contours of this “right to privacy” still need to be
examined, the current body of law should at least recognize
standing in these data breach cases.
B. Personal Data Should Be Recognized Property
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures.349 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that
these protections extend to personal information, such as GPS
locations.350 However, the Fourth Amendment does not specifically
state any protection for personal information. Instead, it lists
persons, houses, paper, and effects.351 Nevertheless, courts have
346. Cf. id. at § 652B (listing the elements for intrusion into seclusion cause
of action).
347. Cf. Redman v. Sentry Group, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 180, 185 (W.D. Va. 1995)
rev’d on other grounds, Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174 (4th Cir.
1997) (allowing the plaintiff to sue the safe manufacturer when the plaintiff’s safe
was defectively made, allowing a thief to steal coins inside).
348. Cf. cases cited supra note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the
reasons why those courts failed to find standing).
349. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
350. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“We hold that the
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
351. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”).
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still interpreted this list to include personal information.352 The
only logical way to resolve this incongruency is to conclude that
personal information is a type of property protected under the
Fourth amendment. However, in the context of these data breach
cases, the Non-Standing Cases abandon the concept that personal
information is a type of private property.353 If they had not
abandoned this concept, the courts would have found there to be
sufficient injury to grant standing under a bailor-bailee theory.354
Furthermore, there would be no need for any risk of future injury
analysis; the initial hack is proof enough of injury.355 Again, while
the exact contours of this property right still need to be delineated,
the current body of law should at least recognize standing under a
property right theory.
V. Conclusion
The circuit split that has emerged causes ambiguity and
prevents injured plaintiffs from achieving relief.356 The current
standing requirements that the Non-Standing Cases impose upon
plaintiffs present nearly insurmountable burdens.357 It is time for
courts to rule like the Standing Cases.358 First, courts should
presume, for standing purposes, that when a hacker perpetuates a
hack upon an enterprise and accesses a confidential database, the
352. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“We hold that the Government's
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
353. Cf. cases cited supra note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the
reasons why those courts failed to find standing).
354. Cf., e.g., Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp. v. Valley Line Co., 420 F. Supp. 568, 570
(implying that there was standing to sue because there was a bailor-bailee
relationship).
355. Cf. id. (implying that there was standing to sue because there was a
bailor-bailee relationship).
356. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (listing the circuit
split regarding data breach cases).
357. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs); see also cases cited supra
note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the reasons why those courts failed
to find standing).
358. See cases cited supra note 77 (explaining why the Standing Cases’ courts
ruled as they did).
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hacker copied the information and plans to misuse it.359 Second,
courts should only focus upon the hacking event when determining
if there is injury, not upon whether the hacker, a third-party to the
litigation, has yet effectuated an identity theft.360 The hack alone,
because of the presumption listed above, should provide a
sufficient risk of future injury to satisfy the Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence.361 In the alternative, courts should start
to recognize that the harmed individuals have standing to sue the
hacked enterprise because these types of data breaches violate the
common law of intrusion into seclusion.362 Further, courts should
begin to recognize that an individual’s private information is that
individual’s property.363 Such a conclusion would allow the courts
to avoid these difficult future injury inquiries and always find
standing for the affected individuals.364 Regardless of the route
that the courts decide to take, plaintiffs, whose personal
information was exposed, deserve, at the very least, to get through
the court’s doors.

359. See supra notes 241–86 and accompanying text (indicating that courts
should presume that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise
database).
360. See supra notes 319–32 and accompanying text (arguing that the hacking
event is sufficient to grant standing and plaintiffs should not be forced to sit and
wait for the injury to materialize).
361. Compare id. (arguing that the hacking event is sufficient and plaintiffs
should not be forced to sit and wait for the injury to materialize), and supra notes
241–88 and accompanying text (indicating that courts should simply presume
that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database), with cases
cited supra notes 45–75 (explaining the current constitutional standing
jurisprudence).
362. See supra notes 341–48 and accompanying text (arguing that courts
should recognize that an individual has standing to sue the hacked enterprise
through an intrusion into seclusion cause of action).
363. See supra notes 351–58 and accompanying text (arguing that courts
should recognize that an individual’s personal information is property).
364. Cf., e.g., Continental Nat’l Am. Group v. Valley Line Co., 420 F. Supp.
568, 570 (implying that there was standing to sue because there was a
bailor-bailee relationship).

